

VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #0435/01 0422020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD2C918C MSI9126-695)
P 112020Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6965
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1634
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB 9905
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY 6975
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA PRIORITY 2992
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 7684
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY 4817
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDTA/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1972

UNCLAS BOGOTA 000435

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY FOR CAPTION
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: [MARR](#) [EAID](#) [PREL](#) [SNAR](#) [PTER](#) [ETRD](#) [PREF](#) [CO](#)
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FEBRUARY 18-22 CAPSTONE VISIT TO
COLOMBIA

Summary

1. (SBU) We welcome the visit of the CAPSTONE fellows to Colombia, which comes at a key time in the U.S.-Colombia bilateral relationship. In ten years, Colombia has progressed from a near failed state and terrorist haven to an economic, political, and social leader in Latin America. Colombia has made major progress in its fight against illegal armed groups and set records in the eradication and interdiction of drugs. Murder and kidnapping rates have dropped dramatically, while rule of law is strengthened through major judicial reforms. Improved security has grown the economy, reduced poverty, and attracted record levels of investment. The GOC has looked to leverage these successes beyond its borders by offering troops to NATO in Afghanistan and providing counterterrorism and counternarcotics training to Mexican, Panamanian and other law enforcement agencies in the region.

2. (SBU) Significant challenges remain, many of which will be of special interest to the CAPSTONE group. Drug trafficking organizations and illegal armed groups continue to operate in large parts of the country, including border areas. Colombia has over three million internally displaced persons, and deep social divides still prevent millions of citizens, especially in rural areas, from benefiting fully from security and economic gains. Despite progress on human rights, some elements of the security forces continue to violate human rights, and the military has been accused of numerous extrajudicial killings of innocents. Violence against trade unionists continues even as the GOC has stepped up prosecutions and boosted its protection programs for unionists, human rights activists, and other vulnerable individuals. USG support is critical to help the GOC confront these persistent challenges, even as we continue our dialogue on how best to transfer key security tasks from the USG to the GOC. End Summary.

CAPSTONE Program

3. (SBU) You will meet with Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos and his team to hear about the GOC's experience in confronting illegal armed groups (IAGs) and drug trafficking organizations. Meetings within the embassy will review our

integrated programs and policies including our unified Country Team effort in support of our shared goals. You will also visit the Colombian Military's main area of effort against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Joint Task Force Omega (JTF-Omega). Meetings with the Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS), the Colombian National Police (CNP) and the Colombian Army's Counterdrug Brigade (BRACNA) will provide you an overview of counternarcotics initiatives. Your visit will provide a comprehensive overview of the GOC's efforts-with USG assistance--to strengthen democratic institutions, consolidate control over its national territory through the "democratic security" policy, and improve its human rights record.

Democratic Security Advances

¶4. (SBU) Colombia has achieved successes in its fight against the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN) and emerging criminal groups. The rescue of 15 high-profile FARC hostages in July 2008, including three Americans, and the deaths of key FARC leaders highlight Colombia's progress in security. Colombian security forces captured or killed a number of mid-level FARC leaders, and reduced the space in which terrorists can operate freely. A record number of FARC members deserted in 2008--including high-level commanders. Total demobilizations of illegal armed groups reached 3461 in 2008--primarily from the FARC--making it the highest level of demobilizations in Colombia's history.

¶5. (SBU) With USG help, in 2008, Colombia again set records in eradication and interdiction of drugs, while further reducing murder and kidnapping rates. Colombia extradited a record 208 criminals, narcotraffickers and terrorists to the

United States in 2008, including 15 senior ex-paramilitary leaders; Colombia has already extradited 20 criminals in ¶2009. The number of homicides fell for the sixth consecutive year, dropping to 16,140 (or 33 for every 100,000 habitants), 45 percent lower than 2002 levels.

Regional Context

¶6. (SBU) Colombia sees itself as a key U.S. ally in an Andean region increasingly hostile to U.S. values and goals. Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Colombia after a military strike in March 2008 against FARC Commander Raul Reyes's camp just across the border in Ecuador. The GOC maintains a moderate tone with Ecuadorian President Correa, despite his often angry rhetoric. Ecuador recently imposed strict requirements on Colombians wishing to travel to their southern neighbor.

¶7. (SBU) Relations with Venezuela are now stable, and have improved since Venezuela recalled its ambassador following the Reyes attack. Presidents Uribe and Chavez met in late January in Cartagena, signing several economic cooperation agreements. However, Colombia remains wary of Venezuelan ties to the FARC, as evidenced in the computers found in the Raul Reyes camp. Beyond the Andes, Colombia is helping Mexico to combat terrorism, narcotrafficking and other criminal activity. Colombia is also working with Mexico, Chile, Peru and Brazil to promote economic integration and strengthen democratic institutions in Latin America. Colombia has also to send engineering and special forces to Afghanistan under NATO auspices, and contributes troops to the Multi-National Observer Forces in the Sinai.

Economic Growth and Free Trade

¶8. (U) After several years of strong economic growth, Colombia has begun to feel the pinch of the global economic crisis. Growth slowed to 3.5% in 2008 after record growth of 7.5% in 2007. Colombia remains dependent on commodity exports (petroleum, coal, flowers, coffee), making it

vulnerable to price drops. Colombia cut unemployment and poverty during the past six years, but those gains have stalled. The financial sector is relatively solid and has been cushioned to date against the global credit crunch by conservative lending practices. The slowing economy led to growing popular concern over pocketbook issues, and a pyramid scandal in 2008 cost Colombians an estimated \$1 billion in savings. The GOC inked trade deals with Canada, Chile, Central America and smaller European countries. The GOC is now negotiating an agreement with the EU. The U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (CPTA) remains a bilateral priority for the Colombian government and private sector, and the GOC will likely consult with you as to how it can work together with the Congress to promote its passage.

Serious Challenges Ahead

¶9. (SBU) Despite advances in security and development, challenges related to violence, narcotrafficking, displacement, human rights, labor rights, and minority groups remain. We estimate the FARC has 8,000 operational guerrillas in the field, and organized narcotrafficking groups continue to cause violence. Internal displacement due to the armed conflict remains serious, with three million displaced by violence since 1995. Deep historical social divides make it difficult for millions from the Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations to benefit fully from security and economic gains. These minority groups suffer from limited education, health care, and employment opportunities, and disproportionate forced displacement in the mostly isolated rural areas where they reside.

¶10. (U) Colombia has publicly committed to improving its human rights performance. Eighty Colombian military officers were recently dismissed due to alleged involvement in extrajudicial killings. We are working with the Ministry of Defense to improve rules of engagement, and make sure that soldiers accused of human rights abuses are investigated by

civilian prosecutors. Labor unionists and homicides declined 76 percent between 2001-2008, yet in 2008 the number of labor homicides (for all causes) increased from 39 to 46--largely due to a spike in the first quarter--although still well below the national homicide rate.

¶11. (U) Through the Center for Coordinated and Integrated Action (CCAI), the GOC is recovering territory previously held by illegal armed groups and establishing government, state services and securing vulnerable communities. In 2008, the GOC reestablished a government presence in all 1098 municipalities and all the country's mayors once again resided within their municipalities. A coordination plan for Macarena--the historic heartland of the FARC--aims to establish a permanent military, police and civilian presence in post-conflict areas--some of which have never seen a viable GOC presence. Challenges remain, as resource, security and staffing shortfalls continue to limit the initiative. The United States, through USAID, MILGRP and NAS, provides assistance to CCAI.

USAID: Aiding Communities At Risk

¶12. (U) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more than \$950 million in economic and social assistance via USAID. USAID's initiatives have delivered legal jobs, social services, and development in narcotrafficking and conflict zones. We are reintegrating thousands of Colombians who have demobilized, abating child recruitment into armed groups, and increasing social services for victims of conflict. We are restoring citizen confidence in governance, improving the criminal justice system and institutions, increasing the poor's access to justice, and promoting human rights through investigation and prosecution of human rights and labor-related cases. These programs focus on communities at high-risk of violence, provide legal and psycho-social assistance, and strengthen key Government oversight and

judicial institutions.

13.(U) USAID's alternative development program is a key component of our counter-narcotics efforts. It promotes sustainable economic opportunities in regions vulnerable to drug production and conflict. These programs create jobs and economic opportunities in areas recently retaken from illegal armed groups and build the social infrastructure to mitigate future conflict. USAID is expanding social and economic opportunities and improving livelihoods for Afro-Colombians and indigenous communities disproportionately affected by conflict. These programs provide jobs, education, healthcare, housing, and social services for these vulnerable populations.

DOJ: Providing Justice Reform

¶14. (U) The Department of Justice (DOJ) coordinates a multifaceted program focused on strengthening the Colombian criminal justice system, its institutions, processes and personnel. This program involves six major areas: implementation of an accusatory system; human rights investigations and prosecutions; Justice and Peace investigations and prosecutions; complex areas of criminal law; improved forensics capability; and witness protection. The bulk of the assistance is provided through training and technical assistance to the Prosecutor General's Office.

NAS: Eradicating, Training, Nationalizing

¶15. (U) We made real strides in battling narcoterrorism in Colombia in 2008. The most recent U.S. figures for cocaine production in Colombia show a 24% reduction in production since the peak year 2001. In 2008, Colombian security forces seized 245 metric tons of cocaine and coca paste, eradicated 230,000 hectares of coca and destroyed 3667 drug labs. We kept hundreds of metric tons out of the United States. We have reduced the funds available to the FARC and other criminal groups for the purchase of weapons and explosives, corruption of public officials, and coercion of local populations.

¶16. (U) We have made progress in eradication. Increased coordination between manual and aerial eradication improves our ability to deal with replanting. Much of the success in battling narcotrafficking and terrorism is due to air mobility capabilities provided by the United States. Without helicopters, the GOC could not project force or provide government presence in a country the size of Texas and California combined. Colombia is nationalizing our aviation assets, but still needs some U.S. support. In the last two years, more than 50 aircraft have been turned over to the GOC to fund, maintain, and control. Colombia's ability to confront narcotics and terrorism depends in large part on its air mobility.

DHS Operations

¶17. (U) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Coast Guard represent Department of Homeland Security interests in Colombia. ICE supports transitional investigations, the Trade Transparency Money laundering Unit (TTU), and the operations of three ICE-vetted investigations units comprised of members of Colombian Law Enforcement Authorities. ICE administers the Customs and Border Patrol Container Security Initiative (CBP/SCI) Cartagena Office and coordinates removals and deportations from U.S to Colombia.

¶18. (U) DHS maintains strong relations with the Colombian National Police (CNP), Colombian Customs (DIAN), and Colombian Immigration (DAS) and other law enforcement agencies. The ICE Attach conducts investigations in the areas of financial/money crimes, arms trafficking, contraband

smuggling, human trafficking and smuggling, fugitive apprehension, and document and benefit fraud. ICE is opening an Office in Cartagena to better address investigations and host government relations along the coast.

MILGRP: Aiming for Irreversibility

¶19. (U) The Military Group (MILGRP) has focused its support to the Colombian military based upon a three phased approach.

The first focused on building Colombian military forces, projecting those forces into ungoverned spaces and securing those spaces. It also supported offensive operations against illegal armed groups on a scale never seen before. The second phase, currently being executed, focuses on securing, consolidating and sustaining those gains, increasing offensive operations against illegal armed groups, and ensuring the irreversibility of those gains. The third phase, to be initiated in 2011, is to promote a strategic partnership to sustain key Colombian military capabilities.

¶20. (U) The MILGRP currently supports eight program areas: joint rotary wing, ground operations, riverine operations, governability, airpower, maritime interdiction, joint intelligence and communications, and joint force initiatives.

Support to these programs is vital in both the short- and long-terms. In the short-term, we will assist Colombia in controlling illegal armed groups and bringing peace and rule of law to the Colombian population. In the long-term, we will focus on building a strategic partnership with Colombian, and develop key Colombian military capabilities that can support U.S. national security objectives worldwide.

New Initiatives

¶21. (SBU) We are working with the GOC, other governments, and international organizations to develop an initiative to consolidate the gains made to date in key conflict areas. The initiative builds on current and past USG and GOC programs, and involves close coordination of security, eradication, alternative development, and institutional development programs. The initiative's primary goal is to provide incentives for Colombian citizens to join the licit economy in the conflict zones plagued by coca cultivation, narcotrafficking and illegal armed groups. These targeted

regions produce roughly 80 percent of the coca in Colombia and serve as major trafficking hubs, with a high incidence of violence and displacement.

BROWNFIELD